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Abstract
The paper builds a theoretical model to analyse the interaction between
minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labour. The rm and
the worker agree on the amount of earnings to report to the scal authorities,
which possess an imperfect detection technology. The introduction of the
minimum wage poses a constraint on the reporting decision and induces an
increase in compliance by some agents. As a consequence, a spike at the
minimum wage appears in the distribution of declared earnings. Moreover, a
nominally neutral scal regime becomes regressive, while scal revenues may
increase.
JEL codes: J38, H26, H32, P2
Keywords: Minimum Wage, Tax Evasion
1 Introduction
What are the scal implications of introducing or increasing the minimum
wage? How can we explain the very high spike at the minimum wage level ap-
pearing in the wage distribution of some countries? This paper contributes to
answering these questions by studying the e¤ects of the interaction between
tax evasion and minimum wage legislation.
The minimum wage is the subject of a rich literature and policy debate1,
mainly focusing on its e¤ect on employment. The traditional view of adverse
labour market e¤ects has been challenged (Card and Krueger, 1995) and, at
present, there is no overwhelming consensus on the issue. Potential benecial
e¤ects of the minimum wage for workers through shifts in the composition of
jobs toward good (i.e. high-wage) jobs have also been discussed (Acemoglu,
2001.) This paper highlights another aspect of minimum wage policy that
has not been considered so far and shows how the minimum wage a¤ects
workers and rms through the "scal channel".
Large e¤orts have also been devoted to the theoretical and empirical
study of tax evasion and the shadow economy2. The study of tax evasion by
employed labour is of particular interest as the scal imposition on labour in
the form of social security contributions (SSC) and personal income tax (PIT)
represents the bulk of scal revenues in many countries3. However, to the
best of my knowledge, the e¤ects of the interaction between underreporting
of earnings and minimum wage legislation have not previously been addressed
1See Brown (1999) for a review.
2See Andreoni et al. (1998) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for surveys on tax evasion
and Schneider and Enste (2000) for a survey on the shadow economy.
3Labour taxes are the largest source of tax revenue in the EU-25, representing around
half of total tax receipts (Eurostat, 2006).
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in a formal model.
Undeclared work is a serious issue in many countries. It is di¢ cult to
obtain reliable data on its extension, but raw estimates indicate that the
phenomenon is relevant, particularly in transition and developing countries
but also in some OECD economies. In a report for the European Commission,
the authors stress how the practice of paying envelope wagesabove the o¢ -
cially declared minimum exists in practically all of the Central and Eastern
European countries (Renooy et al., 2004.) An OECD study of the Baltic
countries (OECD, 2003) estimates that in Latvia and Lithuania, 20% of the
private-sector employees earn more than what is o¢ cially reported4. Similar
gures have been estimated for Bulgaria (Tomev, 2004.) In Russia, 8% of the
employees reported that they received part of their income "under the table"
(Petrova, 2005.) The phenomenon is not limited to CEE economies. OECD
estimates a 30% shortfall in social security contributions due to undeclared
work for Hungary, Mexico and South Korea, and a shortfall above 20% for
Italy, Poland, Spain and Turkey5 (OECD, 2004). According to the World
Bank, "in Argentina, roughly 15 percent of workers receive pay partly on the
books and partly o¤ the books" (World Bank, 2007). A World Bank study
on labour markets in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (World
Bank, 2005) notices how in several countries in the region, "disproportion-
ately high shares of workers cluster on declared wages at or just above the
4The Latvian Central Statistical O¢ ce publishes data on earnings under the heading
"Gross wage of employed excluding all kinds of irregular payments by kind of activity"
(italics added).
5In Turkey, rms belonging to the formal sector are estimated to underreport 28%
of their wage bill and for around 50% of the employees enrolled in SSK (Social Security
Organization), the wages reported by employers are at the minimum insurable level (World
Bank, 2006).
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minimum wage (with evidence of additional undeclared incomes above the
minimum), creating incentives to sustain a high minimum wage to sustain
tax revenue" and calls for further research on this aspect of minimum wage
policy. This is indeed the aim of the present paper.
A simple model of the labour market is created where underreporting
of earnings is made possible by imperfect detection of tax evasion. The
introduction of the minimum wage induces some worker-rm pairs to increase
compliance, while pushing others out of the formal labour market into the
black economy or into inactivity. The increase in compliance is due to the
fact that the minimum wage poses a constraint on reporting behaviour, as
agents must choose whether to report nothing or report at least the minimum
wage. When faced with such a restriction, agents may prefer to increase
their reporting to the minimum wage level rather than decreasing it to zero.
The overall e¤ect when enforcement is not too e¤ective is to unambiguously
increase scal revenues. The distribution of the scal burden is also altered,
turning a nominally neutral scal regime into a regressive one. Moreover,
an otherwise smooth distribution of declared earnings is transformed by the
introduction of the minimum wage into a distribution presenting a spike at
the minimum wage level. The model also predicts a positive correlation
between the size of the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the
informal economy. Some supporting evidence on this is presented.
The next section discusses some of the related literature. The model is
introduced in the third section. In section 4, the various e¤ects of introducing
the minimumwage are explored. Section 5 looks at the model implications for
the relationship between the spike at the minimumwage and the underground
economy. The following section briey explores the quantitative implications
of the model. In section 7, some extensions of the model are discussed. The
3
last section concludes.
2 Related literature
The literature on tax evasion has mainly been focused on personal income
tax and the compliance decision by an individual lling the tax declaration
form. However, due to the tax withholding and information reporting sys-
tems present in many countries, this is not an accurate description for the
case of employed labour. Indeed, the rate of non-compliance for wages and
salaries at the stage of lling the tax declaration form is often negligible. For
instance, Klepper and Nagin (1989) report a mere 0.1% of non-compliance
for wages and salaries at this stage in the US, i.e. lower than for any other
income category. Therefore, to study tax evasion by employed labour it is
necessary to take the interaction between the employer and the employee
into account.
The literature specically looking at the labour market e¤ects of tax
evasion often considers the formal and informal sections of the labour market
as separate, with workers and rms being either completely underground or
completely compliant with the regulation. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) are a
recent example of this. Fugazza and Jacques (2003) also take this approach
in their study of the e¤ect of labour market institutions when there is an
underground sector.
Another strand of the literature, in line with the view taken in this pa-
per, considers that workerscompliance with regulation can also be partial.
Sandmo (1981) and Cowell (1985) study models where working time can be
allocated between the formal and informal sectors. The former is mainly
interested in determining the optimal income tax and enforcement, the lat-
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ter in investigating the e¤ects of scal and enforcement parameters on the
dimension of the informal sector. Kolm and Nielsen (2005) study a search
model with wage bargaining, where the worker and the rm agree on the
amount of remuneration not to be reported to the scal authorities. They
nd that both higher taxes and weaker enforcement reduce unemployment.
Bargaining between the rm and the workers over the true and reported
wage is also assumed by Yaniv (1992) who explores the impact of scal and
detection parameters on tax evasion and contrasts a withholding and a self-
declaration system. However, none of the above mentioned studies considers
the impact of minimum wage legislation in an economy with underreporting.
The literature on minimum wage deals extensively with its e¤ects on
wage distribution and employment. A spike at the minimum wage level has
been observed in several instances (see, for instance, DiNardo et al., 1996,
Dickens and Manning, 2004). Such a spike has been dened as a "puzzle"
for several standard types of labour market models (Brown, 1999) and as
an "anomalous nding from the standpoint of the standard model of the
low wage labour market" (Card and Krueger, 1995, p. 152). Proposed
rationalizations include reductions in non-wage compensation or increases in
required e¤ort to o¤set a binding minimum wage, atter earnings proles
and adjustments in the amounts of hours worked. The model presented
here proposes an alternative rationale for the observed spike in a perfect
competition framework. The positive correlation between the size of the spike
at the minimum wage and the estimated size of the informal economy in the
data presented in the Appendix suggests that the mechanism analysed in
this paper indeed contributes to shape the observed distribution of earnings
in some countries. Recently, several empirical studies have considered the
impact of the minimum wage on other aspects than employment, like fringe
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benets (Simon and Kaestner, 2004), prices (Lemos, 2005), prots (Draca et
al., 2006.) The impact of the minimum wage on tax evasion has, to the best
of my knowledge, never been investigated.
3 The model without minimum wage
The size of the population is exogenously given and normalized to 1. Every
individual has an exogenously given productivity yi, distributed in the pop-
ulation according to pdf g(y) and cdf G(y) on the support [y
¯
; y], where y
¯
 0.
We assume the labour market to be competitive, each rm employs one
worker, there is no capital, and production is equal to labour input. More-
over, there is free entry of rms, rms can observe workersproductivity, and
workers can move from one rm to another at no cost.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected prots. In an environment
without tax evasion, prots for a rm employing a worker with productivity
yi are given by
i = yi   wi,
where wi is the gross wage6. Firms have an obligation to withhold taxes and
social security contributions and transfer them to the authorities. Taxation
is at the proportional rate t 2 (0; 1). Workers are risk-averse, their (indirect)
utility is an increasing function of net income, given by
Ii = wi(1  t).
The wedge between the gross wage paid by the rm and the net wage received
by the worker, twi, is paid to the scal authorities. Free entry of rms implies
6No distinction is made between labour cost and gross wage and the two concepts are
equivalent in the model.
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that in equilibrium, the expected prots are zero which, in turn, in the full
compliance case implies that a worker with productivity yi would receive a
gross wage yi, from which the rm would deduct taxes tyi, thereby leaving
the worker a net wage (1  t)yi.
In this economy, however, it is possible to evade taxes and social security
contributions by not reporting part or all of the workers earnings to the
authorities. A rm employing a worker with productivity yi must therefore
decide how much of the workers production to declare to the tax authorities,
xi, and how much to conceal, yi   xi. If xi = yi, the rm is fully compliant
with the regulations. If xi = 0, the full product is hidden from the authorities
and the rm-worker pair operates completely in the black economy. If xi 2
(0; yi), there is underreporting. A worker-rm pair can thus operate in the
formal economy, by declaring a strictly positive income, or be completely
in the black market, by declaring nothing. A worker can also decide to be
inactive. In this case, income is normalized to 0.
Tax authorities may inspect rms to nd out whether they comply with
scal regulation. We assume there to be an exogenously given probability
of an audit being performed  2 [0; 1]. Fines are imposed on rms in case
tax evasion is detected and, given the assumption of risk-neutral rms and
risk-averse workers, there is no incentive for workers and rms to negotiate
a di¤erent risk-sharing arrangement. However, the fact that an audit is
performed does not imply that the authority with certainty discovers the
true tax liability, but it may nd evidence to impute an income y^i 2 [0; yi],
where yi is the true product. For instance, Feinstein (1991) estimates that
IRS examiners on average managed to detect only half of the tax evasion in
the forms they audited7, while Erard (1997) rejects the hypothesis of perfect
7An IRS study found that for every dollar of underreported income detected by examin-
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detection in his empirical investigation of a model where detection can be
either complete or null.
We assume that y^i is distributed over the support [0; yi]8 according to
pdf h() and cdf H(), so that H(0) = 0 and H(yi) = 1, and H() does not
depend on xi. To simplify the discussion, we assume that h() > 0 within
the support, so that H() is invertible within [0; yi].
Given a declaration of xi and collected evidence of a true tax liability
of y^i, the tax authority imposes on the rm, in case y^i > xi , the payment
of t (y^i   xi), consisting of taxes plus an additional ne proportional to the
assessed tax evasion, thus  > 1. In case y^i  xi, the tax authority cannot
prove any tax evasion, so no ne is imposed9. Given a true product yi and a
reported one xi 2 [0; yi], the expected ne in case of auditing, fi, is
fi = t
yiZ
xi
(y^i   xi)h(y^i)dy^. (1)
Below, we determine the equilibrium wage and evasion. For convenience,
subscripts are suppressed where not necessary.
ers without the aid of third-party information documents, another $ 2.28 went undetected
(cited in Feldman and Slemrod, 2007).
8The assumption is that the tax authority cannot assess and upheld in court a tax
liability higher than the true one. To extend the model to situations where this may not be
the case, due for instance to ambiguity in the tax code, would be relatively straightforward.
9An equivalent narrative is that in an audit, the tax authority may nd no evidence at
all of tax evasion with probability H(xi), which is increasing as the tax liability declared
to the authorities increases. Conditional on detection taking place, the density for any
given level of income y^i 2 [xi; yi] being discovered is given by h (y^i) = [1 H (xi)].
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3.1 Equilibrium without minimum wage
For a rm employing a worker with productivity y, declaring x, and paying
a gross wage w, the possible realizations of prots are given by10
 =

y   w with probability 1  
y   w   f with probability  ,
where f , the expected ne in case an audit is conducted, is given by (1).
Therefore, the expected prots for the rm are
E () = y   w   f . (2)
Income I for a worker employed in a rm paying a gross wage w and
declaring to the scal authorities x is given by
I = w   tx. (3)
This expression captures the fact that taxes and social security contributions
are deducted from the workers declared gross wage x, not from his true gross
wage, w. As income is non-stochastic, income maximization corresponds
to utility maximization, given the assumption that (indirect) utility only
depends on net income.
The rm and the worker agree to choose x so as to maximize the ex-
pected total surplus available to them, equivalent to the product minus total
expected payments to scal authorities, represented by taxes and social secu-
rity contributions paid on the declared wage and expected nes. Therefore,
the optimal declaration is
x s:t: max
x2[0;y]
y   f   tx. (4)
10Actually, when an audit is performed, possible realizations of prots are a continuum,
due to the stochastic nature of the ne. For expositional convenience, the expected value
of the ne is considered.
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After substituting (1) into (4), the rst-order condition is
H(x) = 1  1

() x = H 1

1  1


.
The second-order condition
 th(x) < 0
is always satised. The boundary condition x  y is always satised. Notice
that full compliance (i.e. x = y) does not take place unless  ! +1. The
condition x  0 implies that full evasion will take place, i.e. x = 0, when
enforcement is very weak, i.e   1. To simplify the notation, the two
enforcement parameters are summarized by   1= (). To summarize, the
solution to the reporting problem without minimum wage is given by
x =

H 1 (1  ) if  < 1
0 if   1 . (5)
As @=@ < 0 and @=@ < 0 , in an interior solution, the fraction of
production that is evaded decreases as enforcement improves.
The equilibrium ne, f , is given by substituting (5) into (1). Substituting
this into (2) and considering the free entry condition, we get the equilibrium
gross wage
w = y   f ,
that substituted into (3) gives the equilibrium net income
I = y   f    tx. (6)
To simplify the discussion, from now on we will assume h() to be uniform
in the support [0; y], i.e. y^i s U[0;yi]. The expression for the expected ne
10
becomes11
f = t(y   x)2= (2y) : (7)
The optimal reporting behaviour given by (5) becomes
x =

(1  ) y if  < 1
0 if   1 (8)
thus, the model implies that, irrespective of the specic level of productivity,
a constant fraction of the true tax liability is revealed to the scal authorities.
Using (7), the expected ne is given in equilibrium by
f  =

yt=2 if  < 1
yt= (2) if   1 (9)
and thus, substituting (8) and (9) into (6), we get the workers equilibrium
net income
I =

y(1  t) + yt=2 if  < 1
y [1  t= (2)] if   1 . (10)
Given the detection technology, the expected fraction of unreported tax
liability, y   x, that is discovered in case of auditing is
yZ
x
(y^   x)h(y^)dy^= (y   x) = =2, (11)
i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded income over true
product. The assumption is thus that it is relatively easy to get away with tax-
evasion. For example, in an economy where 30% of the income are concealed,
only 15% of the evasion are, on average, detected in case of auditing.
11The Appendix presents an alternative setting for imperfect detection giving rise to an
equivalent expression for the expected ne. It also discusses the case of the probability of
an audit being conditioned on declared income.
11
4 E¤ects of the minimum wage
In this section, we study what are the e¤ects of introducing a minimum
monthly wage $, with universal coverage, in the economy described in the
previous section. Workers cannot be legally employed at a wage below the
minimum, in the sense that their reported gross wage cannot be below the
minimum. The assumption in the model is that the minimum wage is xed
on a monthly basis for full-time work and that no alternative working-time
arrangements are available. However, in section 7.1, the model is extended
to the case where the minimum wage is xed on an hourly basis, labour
supply can vary across workers and underreporting can involve both hours of
work and hourly wage. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. In the
following, we focus on the case with partial evasion, i.e.  2 (0; 1) 12.
4.1 E¤ects on the distribution
With the introduction of a minimum wage, (4) becomes
x s:t: max
x2f0g[[$;y]
y   f   tx.
The only di¤erence is in the choice set which shrinks from [0; y] to f0g[[$; y].
The introduction of the minimum wage divides worker-rm pairs into three
categories:
12For this to be the case, we need  > 1. By assumption  > 1, but , the probability
of being subject to an audit, may be low, so this condition may seem restrictive. Notice,
however, that in this model, an audit is extremely ine¤ective. As already mentioned if, for
instance, 30% of the income are evaded, only 15% of the evaded income are, on average,
discovered during an audit. Thus, instead of a full-edged investigation, an audit should
in the present set-up rather be interpreted as a routine check by the scal authorities, thus
occurring much more frequently than a thorough inquiry.
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1. High productivity: yi > $= (1  )
2. Intermediate productivity: $  yi  $= (1  )
3. Low productivity: yi < $:
Worker-rm pairs characterized by high productivity would have declared
more than the minimum wage anyway, so they are una¤ected by it. The
minimum wage is instead a binding constraint for worker-rm pairs that
would have declared less in its absence. We rst analyse the case of low-
productivity workers.
Low productivity A worker with productivity below the minimum wage,
yi < $, can only work in the black market or be inactive. The possibility of
a worker paying back part of his wage to the rm is thus excluded. The main
results are qualitatively una¤ected by this modelling choice. From (10), we
get income in case of work in the black market, i.e. full evasion,
Ibm  yi [1  t= (2)] . (12)
Income in case of inactivity is assumed to be 0. The labour market status is
chosen by comparing income in the two cases, giving the following condition
Ibm > 0 ,  > t=2.
Then, if  > t=2, workers with productivity below the minimum wage work
in the black market, otherwise they withdraw from the labour market. Thus,
the prediction is that, for a given tax rate, in economies where enforcement
is quite e¤ective, i.e.  is low, the minimum wage pushes workers into in-
activity and therefore, it has a negative impact on e¢ ciency, as productive
labour remains idle. Instead, in economies where enforcement is not very
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e¤ective, the minimum wage has no negative impact on e¢ ciency as workers
continue to produce in the black market. Naturally, this is true as far as
going completely underground does not entail a drop in productivity.
Intermediate productivity The possibility of declaring the minimum
wage and thus, participating in the formal labour market, is available for
worker-rm pairs whose optimal declaration in case of no minimum wage
regulation is less than $, but with a productivity above $, i.e.
(1  )yi  $  yi , $  yi  $= (1  ) . (13)
Income in case of declaring $ is given by substituting x = $ in (7) and (6)
Imw  yi(1  t) + (yi  $) t  t (yi  $)2 = (2yi) . (14)
Declaring a wage higher than the minimum is never optimal for this group.
Moreover, as Imw > 0 for productivities satisfying (13), these workers will
never go into inactivity. The choice is thus between declaring the minimum
wage or working in the black market and declaring 0. The comparison be-
tween income in case of declaring the minimum wage and income in the black
market as given by (12) gives the following condition
Imw  Ibm , yi  $= [2(1  )]  ymw. (15)
As the choice between employment at the minimum wage and employment
in the black market is only relevant for workers satisfying (13) to determine
the behaviour once a minimum wage is introduced, it is necessary to position
ymw in the interval [$;$= (1  )]. The threshold ymw is greater than the
minimum wage if and only if  > 1=2, while it is always the case that
ymw < $= (1  ). Thus, if the degree of underreporting is high, i.e.  > 1=2,
14
the threshold ymw is internal to the interval dened by condition (13). This
implies that some of the workers a¤ected by the minimum wage and with a
productivity higher than the minimum wage prefer to decrease evasion and
declare the minimum, while others prefer to go into the black market. If the
degree of underreporting is instead low, i.e.   1=2, all workers a¤ected by
the minimum wage and with a productivity higher than the minimum wage
prefer to increase compliance and declare the minimum.
The results are summarized in the below proposition.
The introduction of the minimum wage in an economy with underreport-
ing of earnings induces some workers to increase compliance by increasing
declared earnings to the minimum wage level. Workers with a high produc-
tivity are una¤ected. Workers with a productivity below the minimum wage
work in the black market if enforcement is not too e¤ective, otherwise they
withdraw from the labour force.
The distribution of declared earnings x before the introduction of the
minimum wage is given by
gx(x) =
8
<
:
g
 
x
1 

y
¯
(1  ) < x < y(1  )
0 otherwise
,
where g() is the pdf of the productivity distribution. After the introduction
of the minimum wage, distribution of declared earnings is given by
gmw(x) =
8
>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
R $maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
y
¯
g(y)dy if x = 0
R $
1 a
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
g(y)dy if x = $
g
 
x
1 

if $ < x  y(1  )
0 otherwise:
.
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Figure 1: Declared income
alpha=0.4 , minimum wage=3, t=0.33
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Thus, a "smooth" distribution of productivity is associated with a "smooth"
distribution of declared earnings without a minimum wage. However, with
the introduction of the minimum wage, two spikes appear at the minimum
wage level and at zero. Thus, we can state the following:
In a perfectly competitive labour market with underreporting of earnings,
a spike at the minimum wage level appears in the distribution of declared
earnings.
Figure 1 depicts declared income as a function of productivity with and
without the minimum wage. Declared income when there is no tax evasion
is also plotted as a reference.
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4.2 Fiscal e¤ects
The minimum wage divides worker-rm pairs into three categories: those
declaring nothing, those declaring the minimum wage and the una¤ected, i.e.
those declaring more than the minimum. Here, we rst determine payments
to scal authorities for each category. Then, we use the above analysis of
the distribution of declared earnings to nd out the e¤ects of the minimum
wage on scal revenues.
Payments to scal authorities Total payments, P , to scal authorities
include taxes, T , and expected nes, F . For worker-rm pairs not a¤ected
by the minimum wage, these quantities are
P1 = (1  =2)ty
% T1 = yt(1  )
& F1 = yt=2 .
Underreporting gives worker-rm pairs with a relatively high productivity
the opportunity to reduce the "e¤ective"13 tax rate by a factor =2. For
worker-rm pairs declaring the minimum wage, scal payments are given by
P2 = t$ + t(y  $)2= (2y)
% T2 = t$
& F2 = t(y  $)2= (2y) .
The remaining category is represented by worker-rm pairs that are either
in the black economy (when   t=2) or do not participate in the labour
market (when  < t=2). For workers in the black market, nes are the only
type of payment, so that
P3 = F3 = ty= (2) .
13In the sense of total expected payments to scal authorities, including nes, over total
product, i.e. P=y.
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Workers who withdraw from the labour market do not contribute to the
public nances, so
P4 = F4 = 0.
Notice that P3=y  P2=y  P1=y in the relevant intervals14. Expected pay-
ments as a portion of income are highest for worker-rm pairs in the black
economy and lowest for worker-rm pairs not a¤ected by the minimum wage.
Thus, considering expected total payments, it is possible to state the follow-
ing:
The interaction of minimum wage and underreporting transforms a nom-
inally neutral tax system into a regressive one.
The intuition behind this result is simple: worker-rm pairs try to mini-
mize the share of the product paid to scal authorities. The minimum wage is
not a binding constraint for high productivity workers who manage to reduce
the "e¤ective" tax rate. For instance, if  = 40%, the "e¤ective" tax rate
for these workers is 80% of t. For workers with intermediate productivity,
the minimum wage is binding. Thus, they are less "successful" in minimizing
their "e¤ective" tax rate, even if they still manage to reduce it below t. Low
productivity workers are even more constrained, as their only choice is to
work in the black market or withdraw from the labour market, and they may
end up facing an "e¤ective" tax rate above t. With  = 40%, for instance,
the "e¤ective" tax rate for these workers is indeed 125% of t. Figure 2 shows
the e¤ective tax rate as a function of productivity.
14In particular, P2=y  P1=y 8y; P3=y  P1=y 8y; P3=y  P2=y , y  $2(1 ) .
As only workers with productivity yi  $max
n
1; 12(1 )
o
will declare the minimum
wage, P3=y  P2=y for the relevant interval.
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Figure 2: E¤ective tax rate
alpha=0.4 , minimum wage=3, t=0.33
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E¤ects of the minimum wage on revenues When workers with produc-
tivity below the minimum wage work in the black market, i.e. when   t=2,
total revenues R are given by
R =
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1gZ
0
ty= (2) g (y) dy+
$=(1 a)Z
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
[t w + t (y  $)2 = (2y) ]g (y) dy+
+
yZ
$=(1 a)
(1 =2) tyg(y)dy. (16)
The marginal worker is indi¤erent between being employed in the black mar-
ket or declaring the minimum wage if  > 1=2, while he prefers not to be
completely underground if t=2    1=2. In the rst case, the only e¤ect
of a marginal increase in the minimum wage is to extract higher payments
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from workers declaring it while in the second case, there is the additional
e¤ect of pushing worker-rm pairs previously in the o¢ cial economy into the
black market. In both cases, total revenues increase with an increase in the
minimum wage, i.e.
@R
@$
> 0.
When workers with a productivity below the minimum wage withdraw from
the labour market, i.e. when  < t=2 , there is no black market from which to
extract nes, and total revenues are given by the last two terms in expression
(16). Then,
@R
@$
=  t wg($) +
$=(1 a)Z
$
[1  (y  $) = (y)]tg(y)dy.
The rst term represents the scal loss due to the withdrawal of workers
from the labour market, the second term the higher payments by workers
declaring the minimum wage. The net e¤ect depends on the shape of the
distribution. We can then state the following proposition:
When underreporting is high, revenues increase with the minimum wage.
When underreporting is low, the e¤ect of increasing the minimum wage on
revenues depends on the productivity distribution.
The intuition is straightforward: maximization of workersnet income is
equivalent to minimization of transfers to the government. Choice is limited
to the possible declaration space f0g [ [$;+1). Increasing the minimum
wage shrinks the possible declaration space, so that the newly chosen compli-
ance after the increase in the minimum wage cannot make workers better o¤.
When the increase in the minimum wage does not have a negative impact
on production, i.e. it does not "shrink the pie", this implies that the govern-
ment cannot be made worse o¤, i.e. revenues cannot decrease. This can be
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counterbalanced by a decrease in revenues due to reduced total production
when an increase in the minimum wage pushes low productivity workers out
of the labour market.
This implies that countries where underreporting is serious because of
limited enforcement capacity can use the minimum wage to boost scal rev-
enues, without having to worry too much about the impact on e¢ ciency.
As enforcement improves, the minimum wage becomes a less e¤ective scal
instrument and e¢ ciency issues become more prominent. However, equity is-
sues are also at stake, as the minimum wage increases revenues by extracting
more payments from low productivity workers.
The revenue boosting e¤ect of the introduction of a minimum wage can be
substantial. In Bulgaria, for instance, social security contribution payments
increased by almost 20% in 2003 "[a]s a result from the registration of the
labour contracts and the introduction of the minimum insurance income upon
principal economic activities and qualication groups of professions, as well
as from the improved economic situation" (NSSI).
5 Underground economy and minimum wage
spike
Both the size of the spike at the minimum wage and the size of the under-
ground economy relative to the economy as a whole are determined by the
interplay of the productivity distribution, the scal enforcement parameters
as summarized by , and the minimum wage, $. In this section, we study
the link between the size of the underground economy and the size of the
spike.
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The spike at the minimum wage The size of the spike at the minimum
wage is given by
S =
Z $=(1 a)
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
g(y)dy.
A decrease in enforcement parameters, i.e. an increase in , induces the
minimum wage to be declared by some workers previously declaring more,
thereby increasing the size of the spike. If enforcement is su¢ ciently weak,
i.e. if 1=2 <  < 1, an additional e¤ect plays a role, as some workers
previously declaring the minimum wage prefer to go into the black economy,
thus reducing the size of the spike. In this case
@S
@
> 0 , g

$
1  a

>
1
2
g

$
2 (1  a)

.
Assuming that the distribution of productivity is single peaked, the above
condition is satised if the minimum wage is binding for workers with produc-
tivity lower than the mode. If this is the case, the spike is always increasing
as  increases.
The e¤ect on the size of the spike of a marginal increase in the minimum
wage depends on the interplay between two e¤ects: as $ increases, some
workers previously declaring the minimum wage are pushed out of the formal
labour market, thus decreasing the size of the spike, while some, previously
declaring more, declare the minimum wage, thus increasing the size of the
spike. Given , the condition for the size of the spike to increase as the
minimum wage increases is
@S
@$
> 0 , g

$
1  a

> g ($)max f1  a; 1=2g .
Also in this case are a single peaked productivity distribution and a minimum
wage binding for workers with productivity lower than the mode su¢ cient
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conditions for the spike to increase with the minimum wage.15
The informal economy When workers with a productivity below the
minimum wage work in the black market, i.e. when   t=2, the size of the
underground economy16 is given by:
U =
Z $maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
y
¯
yg(y)dy
| {z }
black economy
+
Z $=(1 a)
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
(y  $)g(y)dy + 
Z y
$=(1 a)
yg(y)dy
| {z }
underreporting
.
(17)
A decrease in enforcement, i.e. an increase in , increases the size of the
informal economy as workers una¤ected by the minimum wage evade more.
Moreover, when enforcement is already low, i.e. 1=2 <  < 1, some workers
previously declaring the minimum wage go into the black economy, thereby
further increasing informality.
An increase in the minimum wage pushes some workers previously declar-
ing the minimum wage into the black economy, thus increasing informality,
but also forces workers continuing to declare the minimum to declare more of
15The analysis can also be conducted in terms of the size of the spike, relative to the
size of the o¢ cially employed workforce, where the latter is given by:
L =
Z y
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
g(y)dy:
The conditions for the spike relative to the o¢ cially employed workforce, S=L, to increase
with  and $ are looser than those for S, as the size of the o¢ cially employed workforce
is not increasing with  and $.
16The analysis is made on the size of the informal economy in absolute terms, U . The
size of the informal economy relative to the economy as a whole, U=Y , or relative to the
size of the formal economy, U= (Y   U), is also of interest. When   t=2, the size of
the economy is given by Y =
R y
y
¯
yg(y)dy and does not depend on  or $. Thus, the
derivatives of U , U=Y , U= (Y   U) w.r.t.  and $ all have the same sign.
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their true income, thus reducing informality. Which e¤ect prevails depends
on the shape of the productivity distribution.
When workers with productivity below the minimum wage withdraw from
the labour market; i.e. when  < t=2, there is no black market, thus the size
of the underground economy is given by the last two terms in expression (17).
Also in this case does a decrease in enforcement, i.e. an increase in , increase
the size of the informal economy as workers una¤ected by the minimum wage
evade more17. The absolute size of the informal economy decreases with an
increase in the minimum wage, as workers declaring the minimum increase
their compliance. However, in this case, an increase in the minimum wage
reduces the size of the economy that is given by Y =
R y
$ yg(y)dy. The e¤ect
of an increase in the minimum wage on the size of the informal economy
relative to the economy as a whole, U=Y , or relative to the formal economy,
U= (Y   U), is ambiguous, as it depends on the shape of the productivity
distribution. To summarize:
When enforcement decreases, the size of the informal economy increases,
both in absolute terms or relative to the formal economy. Su¢ cient condi-
tions for the size of the spike at the minimum wage to increase when enforce-
ment decreases are a single peaked productivity distribution combined with
a minimum wage binding for workers with productivity lower than the mode
or a not too weak enforcement. The e¤ect of an increase in the minimum
17There is a discontinuity in the size of the informal economy at  = t=2. When
enforcement parameters decrease (i.e.  increases), the size of the informal economy
jumps up discretely as workers previously withdrawn from the labour market enter into
the black market. This jump goes in the same direction as the derivative, so we can state
that the size of the informal economy always increases as enforcement decreases. The
same is true if we consider the size of the informal economy relative to the whole economy,
U=Y , or relative to the formal economy, U= (Y   U).
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wage on the size of the informal economy relative to the formal economy is
ambiguous. A su¢ cient condition for the size of the spike at the minimum
wage to increase when the minimum wage increases is a single peaked pro-
ductivity distribution combined with a minimum wage binding for workers
with productivity lower than the mode.
Thus, under mild conditions, the common dependence on  should induce
a positive correlation between the spike at the minimum wage and the size
of the informal economy. Some evidence on this correlation is presented in
the Appendix.
6 A numerical example
In this section, the quantitative properties of the model are briey explored.
Workersproductivity is assumed to be distributed across 37 categories in the
range 1-10, with the distance between adjacent productivity categories being
0.25. In the baseline scenario, the distribution of the workforce across the
di¤erent categories is generated by normalizing the corresponding values of a
lognormal with parameters (1.5; 0.6). Tax and social security contributions
are assumed to be equivalent to 30% and enforcement parameters are such
that without a minimum wage, all agents evade 20% of their income, i.e.
 = 0:2. The minimum wage is assumed to be equal to the income declared
by the 6th productivity category, i.e. 1.8.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of declared earnings among the o¢ cial
workforce before and after the introduction of the minimum wage. Without
the minimum wage, declared earnings are in the range 0.8-8, as 20% of the
product is evaded. The distribution of declared earnings changes with the
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Figure 3: Distribution of declared earnings
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introduction of the minimum wage. The minimum wage creates two spikes,
at the minimum wage level and at zero. As the minimum wage reduces the
size of the o¢ cial workforce by truncating it from below, the distribution of
declared earnings is shifted upward above the minimum wage. Notice that
in the gure, the spike at the minimum wage is the percentage of the o¢ cial
workforce declaring the minimum wage. Instead, the spike at zero is the
percentage of the population not participating in the o¢ cial labour market.
Table 1: Numerical results
Spike $1 Spike 02 Kaitz Index3 Revenues4 Informal Economy5
Scenario 1 - Baseline:  = 1:5  = 0:6  = 0:2 $ = 1:8
8:6 7:7 46:5 4:52 28
Scenario 2 - High Evasion:  = 1:5  = 0:6  = 0:3 $ = 1:575
11:5 4:6 47:3 1:41 44
Scenario 3 - High MW:  = 1:5  = 0:6  = 0:2 $ = 2:2
15:3 11:4 55:2 7:58 29:4
Scenario 4 - High Evasion, High MW:  = 1:5  = 0:6  = 0:3 $ = 1:926
18:7 7:7 56:2 2:76 44:6
Scenario 5 - Spread-out Distribution:  = 1:5  = 0:8  = 0:2 $ = 1:8
10:7 14:3 46:2 8:33 30:7
1: as % of workforce in formal employment.
2: as % of total population.
3: minimum wage over average declared wage.
4: % change in total scal revenues due to the introduction of the minimum wage.
5: size of the informal economy as % of o¢ cial economy.
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Table 1 reports the size of the two spikes. Other indicators are also calcu-
lated. In the model developed in this paper, the minimum wage is assumed
to apply to the workforce as a whole; thus the Kaitz index is simply the
minimum wage divided by the average declared wage. The percentage in-
crease in total scal revenues (taxes and nes) due to the introduction of a
minimum wage is also calculated. Finally, the size of the informal economy
as a percentage of the formal economy is presented. In the baseline scenario,
the informal economy would be 25% of the formal economy without a min-
imum wage, as 20% of income would be evaded. With the minimum wage,
the informal economy is equivalent to 28% of the formal economy. Four
other scenarios are explored. In the "high evasion" scenario, enforcement is
assumed to be weaker, so that 30% of income would be evaded without a
minimum wage constraint, i.e.  = 0:3. The minimum wage remains equiva-
lent to the income declared by the sixth productivity category18. The share
of the population a¤ected by the minimum wage is the same as in the base-
line scenario, as only a reshu­ e between workers declaring zero and workers
declaring the minimum wage takes place19. As established in section 5, the
size of the spike at the minimum wage level increases, together with the size
of the informal economy.
In the "high minimum wage" scenario, the minimum wage is assumed to
be equivalent to the income declared by the eighth productivity category, i.e.
18Due to the increase in evasion, though, the actual level of the minimum wage is lower
than in the baseline scenario.
19Notice that the size of the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the spike
at zero do not add up to the same number in scenarios 1 and 2 and in scenarios 3 and 4
only because the reported spike at the minimum wage level is expressed as a percentage
of the o¢ cial workforce, while the spike at zero is expressed as a percentage of the total
population.
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2. In this case, the minimum wage bites deeper into the wage distribution.
As established in section 5, the size of the spike at the minimum wage level
increases. The signicance from a scal point of view is also increased as
compared to the baseline scenario, as established by Proposition 4.2.
The "high evasion, high minimum wage" scenario combines the two pre-
vious variations. In this case, both the spike at the minimum wage level and
the size of the informal economy reach very high levels.
In the last scenario, the distribution generating the frequencies is changed,
in particular the standard deviation parameter is increased to 0.8. The re-
sulting sizeable change in some of the indicators points to the fact that the
quantitative implications of the model are sensitive to the assumption about
the underlying distribution of productivity. However, these simple calcu-
lations show that the model is able to match the very high spike at the
minimum wage observed in some countries and that the scal implications
of imposing a minimum wage can be sizeable, even if only people with the
lowest productivity are a¤ected.
7 Extensions
In this section, the robustness of the model along several dimensions is dis-
cussed and some extensions are proposed. First, we look at the issue of work-
ing time. The model is extended to account for the fact that hours can also
be underreported. Then, we check the robustness of the model for possible
discontinuities arising when a rm-worker pair goes completely underground.
In particular, discontinuities in productivity and expected nes are consid-
ered. Finally, we look at the implications for the model of accounting for
entitlements from social security.
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7.1 Working time
A minimum wage xed on an hourly basis in an environment where rms
could declare the amount of hours worked with full exibility and no risk of
detection in case of underreporting would pose an extremely loose constraint
on reporting behavior. However, the minimum wage can still play its role
against underreporting of earnings if there are legislative constraints on the
amount of hours that can be reported or incentives not to declare a minimal
amount of hours20 ;21 or if misreporting hours of work can also be detected
and punished. In this section, we consider the latter case.
Suppose that a worker with hourly productivity yi inelastically supplies
hi hours of work per period. However, the worker-rm pair can choose to
report product per hour xi 2 [0; yi] and hours of work  i 2 [0; hi]. The
audit and detection technologies are the same in the two dimensions. In case
of audit, the tax authorities manage to impute x^i 2 [0; yi] and ^ i 2 [0; hi].
For analytical convenience, the probabilities of detection are assumed to be
independent and uniformly distributed over the relevant intervals, so that
gx^i(x^i) = 1=yi and g^ i(^ i) = 1=hi. The corresponding c.d.f. are indicated as
Gx^i and G^ i. The imposed ne, fi, depends on the detected and declared
hours of work and product per hour. In particular, it is possible to distinguish
four cases:
20According to Eurostat data from LFS, the share of part-timers in Central and Eastern
European countries is generally low, at around 7% of the employees.
21According to OECD "To counter this [under-declaring earnings per employee], the
tax authorities may appeal to employment regulations such as the minimum wage and
restrictions on part-time and temporary work. This issue helps explain why countries with
a large informal economy maintain de facto strict employment regulations, even though
these regulations are seen by many analysts as a prime cause of informality." (OECD,
2004, page 227, italics added).
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1. x^i < xi and ^ i <  i ) fi = 0
2. x^i < xi and ^ i >  i ) fi = t (^ i    i)xi
3. x^i > xi and ^ i <  i ) fi = t (x^i   xi)  i
4. x^i > xi and ^ i >  i ) fi = t (x^i^ i   xi i) :
In cases 2 and 3, underreporting is discovered in one dimension only and
the ne is imposed on assessed underreporting in that dimension multiplied
by the declared value on the other dimension. Thus, given a declaration
(xi;  i), the expected ne is given by (subscripts are suppressed where not
necessary):
f = t
2
6666664
yZ
x
hZ

(x^^   x) g(x^; ^)d^dx^ + G^ ()
yZ
x
(x^  x) gx^(x^)dx^+
+xGx^(x)
hZ

(^   ) g^ (^)d^
3
7777775
;
where g(x^; ^) = gx^(x^)g^ (^). Given the hypothesis on the distributions, the
expected ne is equal to:
f = t
 
h2 +  2

(y2 + x2)  4yxh

= (4yh) : (18)
In what follows, the equilibria with and without the minimum wage are
characterized.
Equilibrium without minimum wage If the worker-rm pair chooses
to declare  hours and a product per hour x, the total surplus remaining
within the rm-work pair, equivalent to the workers net income because of
the free entry assumption, is given by
I = yh  xt  f; (19)
31
where f is given by (18.) Therefore, the optimal declaration, equivalent to
(4), is given by:
(x;  ) s:t: max
x2[0;y];2[0;h]
yh  xt  f: (20)
The rst-order conditions are simultaneously satised i¤
  = h 2
p
1  2 x = y 2
p
1  2;
where  = 1= (). To have an interior solution, it is necessary that  < 1=2,
otherwise full evasion in both dimensions takes place. In what follows, it
is assumed that  < 1=2, i.e. enforcement is su¢ ciently strong to avoid
full evasion. The maximand is locally concave at (x;  ); however, it is not
globally concave. To establish whether (x;  ) is indeed the global maximum
point, it is necessary to check the value of the function along the boundaries.
As a reference, the income corresponding to reporting (x;  ) is
I = yh(1  t) + yht: (21)
First, we analyse the boundaries within the axes, i.e. with full evasion in
at least one dimension.
1 . Substituting x = 0 in (19), we get Ijx=0 = yh  t (h2 +  2) y= (4h) ,
that is maximized for  = 0;
2. Substituting  = 0 in (19), we get Ij=0 = yh   t(y2 + x2)h= (4y) ,
that is maximized for x = 0;
Thus, when there is total evasion in one dimension, then it is also optimal
to have total evasion in the other dimension. A positive declaration would
only represent a lower bound on the ne to be paid. Therefore, we need
to compare I given by (21) with the income corresponding to total evasion
given by substituting x = 0;  = 0 in (19):
Ibm = yh  thy=4: (22)
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For  < 1=2; we always have that I > Ibm.
The case with full compliance in at least one dimension is parallel to the
case analyzed in the main model, where indeed there is assumed to be full
reporting of the amount of hours worked.
3. In case x = y, then I is maximized for  = (1   )h, resulting in an
income Ijx=y = yh(1  t) + tyh=2;
4. In case  = h, then I is maximized for x = (1   )y, resulting in the
same income as in the previous case.
Thus, the income when there is total compliance in one dimension is
Ifc = I
jx=y = Ij=h. It is straightforward to show that I > Ifc.
So, the analysis at the boundaries shows that (x;  ) is indeed the global
maximum point.
Equilibrium with a minimum hourly wage Given an hourly minimum
wage $, problem (20) becomes:
(x;  ) s:t: max
x2f0g[[$;y];2[0;h]
yh  xt  f:
Parallel to the main model, workers split into three categories:
1. High productivity: yi > $= 2
p
1  2 ;
2. Intermediate productivity: $  yi  $= 2
p
1  2 ;
3. Low productivity: yi < $.
High productivity workers are una¤ected by the introduction of the mini-
mum wage as they would have declared higher hourly earnings anyway. Low
productivity workers are expelled from the formal labour market and can
choose black market activity or inactivity. The choice is made by comparing
income in the two cases, given by (22) and 0, respectively. This gives rise to
the following condition:
Ibm > 0 ,  > t=4: (23)
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As in the main model, if enforcement is very e¤ective (low ), then the
minimum wage has an e¢ ciency cost as workers with positive productivity
withdraw into idleness. If enforcement is instead not too e¤ective, work-
ers with an hourly productivity below the minimum wage work completely
underground.
To analyse the behaviour of workers with intermediate productivity, we
need to compare the income when declaring the minimum wage to the income
when being completely underground and when fully reporting.
When declaring the minimum wage, i.e. x = $ , the amount of declared
hours maximizing income is given by mw = 2yh$(1 )= (y2 + $2) , giving
an income:
Imw = yh  th

(y2 + $2)2   (2y$)2 (1  )2

=

4y
 
y2 + $2

:
A worker rm pair can always choose to be completely in the informal
economy, i.e. x =  = 0. We have seen that this is the best that can be done
when there is full evasion in at least one dimension. Income in case of full
evasion is given by (22).
The choice between full evasion and declaring the minimum wage is made
by comparing income in the two cases. It turns out that:
Imw > I

bm , yi > $=
2
q
4 (1  )2   1  ymw:
As the minimum wage constraint is binding only if yi < $= 2
p
1  2 and
ymw < $= 2
p
1  2 8 < 1=2, there is always a productivity interval where
workers prefer increasing their compliance to the minimum wage rather than
decreasing it by declaring zero.
To complete the analysis, we need to analyse the remaining boundaries,
i.e. the case with full reporting in at least one dimension.
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In case x = y, the maximum income that can be achieved is Ifc , where
Imw > I

fc and I

bm > I

fc for workers whose productivity is such that they are
a¤ected by the minimum wage. In case  = h, the maximum income that
can be achieved is certainly less than Ifc and thus less than I

mw and I

bm.
Thus, the choice faced by this type of worker is indeed between increasing
compliance to the minimum wage level or decreasing it to zero.
In this section, the model has been extended by allowing hours of work to
be underreported, subject to the same detection technology as earnings. Also
in this case does the introduction of the minimum wage induce some workers
to increase compliance, thereby producing a spike at the minimum wage
level. Proposition 4.1 is thus robust to this extension. As the minimum wage
acts as an e¤ective constraint for the low-productivity part of the workforce,
Propositions 4.2 and 4.2 extend to this more general setting.
7.2 The black economy
The model presents no discontinuity when a rm-worker pair leaves the for-
mal economy and goes completely underground. It may, however, be argued
that being completely in the black economy is substantially di¤erent than
being part of the o¢ cial economy. In particular, we analyse the implication
of possible discontinuities in two key variables: productivity and expected
nes. In the analysis, we assume that enforcement parameters are such that
there is underreporting.
Productivity discontinuity While it seems unlikely that the product
generated by a rm-worker pair is dependent on the reporting behavior in
case of simple underreporting, it is more plausible that completely entering
into the black economy may have an e¤ect. More di¢ cult access to the
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legal protection system to enforce contracts and property rights, inability
to tap formal credit, restricted possibility to advertise, no access to support
programmes (like training schemes, subsidies to R&D) for enterprises are
some of the factors that may cause a decrease in the surplus once a rm
goes underground. On the other side, the avoidance of o¢ cial regulation and
red tape may boost the product of rms fully in the underground economy
(see Loayza, 1996, for a review). The relative relevance of the pros and cons
depends on the specic situation of a country. For instance, an ine¤ective
court system and a credit market that is not accessible for some types of
enterprises (like SME) even if registered may decrease the disadvantage of
being underground.
Extending the model to take this potential discontinuity into account is
straightforward. Assume that productivity is

yi if xi > 0
yi + d if xi = 0
or

yi if xi > 0
yi if xi = 0
:
In case d < 0 or  < 1, the cons of being in the black market outweight
the pros. When there is no minimum wage nothing changes. When there
is a minimum wage $, then the worker-rm pair has a greater incentive to
increase compliance to the minimum wage level, instead of going into the
black market, thus reinforcing the tendency to show a spike at the minimum
wage level and the positive impact of minimum wage on scal revenues.
In case d > 0 or  > 1 (and  > t=2), being in the black market provides
an advantage as compared to being in the o¢ cial economy. In case of an ad-
dictive productivity di¤erence, when there is no minimum wage, worker-rm
pairs characterized by low productivity, i.e. with yi < d(2  t)=

t (1  )2

,
will go into the black market, while nothing changes for higher productivity
pairs. When there is a minimum wage, a positive productivity advantage
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of being in the black market reduces the incentive for rms to declare the
minimum wage level instead of going into the black economy, but as long
as the minimum wage is su¢ ciently high as compared to the productivity
di¤erential, in particular for d < t$ [2y (1  ) $] = [(2  t) y], there is
still a spike at the minimum wage level. In case the productivity di¤erence is
multiplicative, for the no minimum wage case, a su¢ ciently low productivity
advantage, i.e.  < 1 + t(1   )2= (2  t), is necessary for avoiding that
all agents go into the black market. In such circumstances, the incentives to
declare the minimum wage are reduced, but do not disappear. In particular,
a spike at the minimum wage level will be present anyway.
Discontinuity in expected nes A discontinuity at zero declaration may
also exist with regard to the expected ne. Once more, it is not a priori
obvious in which direction such a discontinuity may work. On the one hand,
the non-existence of a company in o¢ cial registers may make it more di¢ cult
to localize it and perform an audit. On the other hand, once an audit is
performed, proving underreporting is much more di¢ cult than proving non-
reporting, as in the latter case the operation of a rm without registration
constitutes evidence in itself. Discontinuities may also exist in the ne applied
in case of detection, with complete underreporting being likely to be punished
more harshly than partial underreporting. Assume the expected ne to be:

f if xi > 0
f if xi = 0
, where f is given by (1).
In case  > 1, being in the black market gives rise to higher expected nes
due to a higher probability of auditing or higher nes imposed in case of
detection. Without a minimum wage, nothing changes. With a minimum
wage, the incentives to declare the minimum are stronger.
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In case  2 (0; 1), being in the black market gives rise to lower expected
nes due to a lower probability of auditing. Unless the advantage of being in
the black market is not too high, every agent goes underground. In particular
for  > (2  ), the equilibrium without a minimum wage will not change,
while in case of a minimum wage, the incentives to declare the minimum wage
instead of going into the black economy are reduced, but do not disappear,
with a spike remaining at the minimum wage level.
7.3 Entitlements from social security
Social security contributions usually provide entitlements in the form of pen-
sions, unemployment benets, health insurance, maternity benets and so
on. If workers value such entitlements, their existence represents an incentive
to contribute and should be taken into account when analyzing the evasion
decision. Entitlements are usually partly linked to contributions and partly
independent of them. Below, the implications for the model are analyzed for
each case.
Proportional transfers Suppose that workers receive a transfer propor-
tional to their declared wage, #x, from social security institutions. In theory,
their value of this could be more than its cost, i.e. # > t. This may be the
case when social security funds run a decit or are subsidized by the gen-
eral budget (and thus by scal imposition on a di¤erent tax base) or when
workers value these transfers highly (for instance because they provide some
insurance that, due to some market failure, cannot be purchased separately.)
In this case, however, there is no reason to evade taxes, so we assume, more
realistically, that # < t. Equation (3) becomes:
I = w   tx + #x:
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In case equation (1) is also modied, so that nes are paid only on the
amount of evasion net of foregone benets, the model is simply modied by
substituting (t   #) to t. In case nes continue to be paid on evaded taxes,
the solution to (4) becomes
x = (1   + #=t) y:
Not surprisingly, evasion declines, while a positive correlation between the
tax rate and the portion of income that is evaded appears. This is consistent
with the results reported by Alm et al. (1990) in their study about Jamaican
employees tax evasion and avoidance. They nd that "the tax base rises
with higher benet for payroll tax contributions and falls with higher mar-
ginal tax rates", albeit estimated elasticities are small. As for the e¤ects of
the minimum wage, the productivity threshold above which workers prefer
to declare the minimum wage is lower in case of transfers proportional to
contributions, thus possibly increasing the size of the spike.
Lump-sum transfers Here, the case of a lump-sum transfer  is analyzed.
The transfer is assumed to be conditional on formal working status. In
the absence of a minimum wage, the only e¤ect of a lump-sum transfer
is to displace complete evasion emerging when enforcement is weak with
a minimal declaration, so as to qualify for the transfer by formally being
part of the workforce. More interestingly, in case of a minimum wage, a
transfer conditional on formal working status represents a further incentive
to declare the minimum wage instead of going into the black market and thus
reduces the productivity threshold above which workers prefer to declare the
minimum wage. In particular, the threshold (15) becomes
ymw = $= [2(1  ) + 2= (t$)] :
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The lump-sum transfer  should be intended as the di¤erence between trans-
fers conditional on being employed and transfers conditional on not being
employed (unemployment benets or other forms of social support.) In case
 < 0, then the threshold would be higher as being formally employed would
mean giving up some net transfer, but the e¤ects of the minimum wage
will not disappear as far as the monetary loss in case of o¢ cial employment
status is su¢ ciently low compared to the minimum wage, in particular for
jj =$ < t(1  )= (2).
8 Conclusions
The paper develops a tractable model of underreporting of earnings by em-
ployed labour and works out the implications of introducing minimum wage
regulation in such an environment.
A contribution of the paper to the literature on tax evasion is to show that
imperfect detection alone is able to generate an internal solution to the tax
evasion decision, even with a xed probability of an audit and risk neutrality
by the agent subjected to this.
The interaction between tax evasion and minimum wage gives rise to a
spike at the minimum wage level. This is a mechanism that has never been
proposed in the literature, that works in a perfectly competitive labour mar-
ket and that can account for the double digit spike present in some countries.
In addition, the model contributes to the policy discussion on minimum
wage in countries where underreporting of earnings is a relevant phenomenon.
In particular, it is shown that introducing or increasing the minimum wage
can boost scal revenues. The discussion of the scal impact of the minimum
wage has usually focused on the expenditure side. The role of the state as
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an employer or the fact that, in some countries, social benets are indexed
to the minimum wage are two reasons why a higher minimum wage might
deteriorate the scal balance. This paper claims that this may not be the
case, if the e¤ect on revenues is su¢ ciently large to counterbalance the higher
spending. However, the boost in revenues is due to extracting more resources
from the lower end of the productivity distribution and introduces some
degree of regressivity in the scal system.
The model also makes a new prediction about the correlation between
the size of the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the informal
economy that nds some support in the data.
The optimal auditing strategy by a tax authority in case it possesses an
imperfect detection technology is subject to ongoing research.
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Appendix
A1 - An alternative setting for imperfect detection
The tax authority devotes   0 units of "auditing resources" to every rm-
worker pair. The more resources, the more income is discovered in expecta-
tion. In particular, if  units of resources are used, then y^, the income for
which the tax authority can nd evidence, is distributed with uniform proba-
bility over the interval [(1 a )y; y], where a > 1 measures the e¤ectiveness
of auditing. Thus,
 if  = 0, i.e. no resources are used, the interval is [0; y]. The fact
that even with no resources there is the possibility of discovering some
evasion may be interpreted as the emergence of evidence from other in-
vestigations or from receiving denunciation or by other costless means;
 if  ! +1 the (degenerated) interval is [y; y] = fyg, i.e. full income
is discovered with certainty;
The pdf of the distribution over the interval [(1 a )y; y] is h(y^) = a=y.
Given that the tax authority devotes resources  to a taxpayer characterized
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by true income y and declared income x, then the expected ne is
f =
8
>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
t
yZ
x
(y^   x)h(y^)dy^ if x  (1  a )y
[(1  a )y   x] t + t
yZ
x
(y^   x)h(y^)dy^ if x < (1  a )y
:
As the part of undeclared income below (1 a )y is discovered with certainty
and a ne is imposed on it, it will never be the case that x < (1   a )y
, provided that the taxpayer knows the detection technology and . Thus,
concentrating on x  (1  a )y we have
f = t
yZ
x
(y^   x)h(y^)dy^ = at(y   x)2= (2y) ;
which is equivalent to (7), where the probability of an audit being performed,
 2 [0; 1], is substituted by the coe¢ cient a  0.
A2 - Audit conditional on report x
The probability of performing an audit can be conditioned on declared income
x, so that  = (x)
As far as (x) < +1, it is impossible to induce full compliance.
Proof. Given a tax liability y and a probability of an audit (x) 2 [0; 1] full
compliance is preferred to declaring x 2 [0; y) i¤
(1  t)y > y   (x)f   tx:
Using (7), this becomes
(1  t)y > y   (x) t
2y
(y   x)2   tx , (x) > 2y
y   x  

x;y:
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As limx!y  x;y = +1 , then, as far as  < +1 , there is a neighborhood
of y in which the above condition cannot hold and thus underreporting is
preferred to full compliance.
In the alternative setting for imperfect detection proposed in this ap-
pendix, the equivalent condition not to have full compliance even in case of
devoted "auditing resources" conditional on declared income is (x) < +1.
The above proposition implies that whatever auditing policy is imple-
mented, there will be some evasion at any income level. So, for any auditing
policy, there is room for the minimum wage to exert its inuence. However,
a xed cost for the taxpayer of being subject to an audit, together with a
higher probability of being audited in case of non-compliance than in case of
full compliance, would undo the result.
A3 - Evidence on underground economy and minimum
wage spike
As stated in Proposition 5, a prediction of the model is that enforcement
parameters (as summarized by ) should induce a positive correlation be-
tween the spike at the minimum wage and the size of the informal economy
relative to the formal economy. In this section, some supporting evidence is
presented.
The two gures in this section present the relationship of the spike at
the minimum wage22 with the size of the informal economy relative to the
22The proportion of full-time employees with earnings exactly equal to the monthly
minimum wage (source: Eurostat). Notice that the data collected by Eurostat are obtained
from administrative sources. For data points indicated with a triangle, the denition is
di¤erent: part-time workers are included (France, Spain), minimum wage is xed on an
hourly basis (France, Ireland, UK, USA), earnings below the minimum wage are also
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Figure 4: Informal economy and minimum wage spike
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formal economy23 and the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage24
(in what follows, this measure is indicated as the Kaitz index.) The countries
included are all countries for which Eurostat reports data on the minimum
wage spike and Schneider (2005) reports estimates of the informal economy.
The sample includes 16 European countries and the US. Ten of the European
countries are Central and Eastern European, where statutory minimum wage
arrangements are common.
A positive correlation clearly appears between the size of the spike at the
included (UK, USA). See Eurostat (2004) for details.
23Informal economy as % of o¢ cial GDP (source: Schneider 2005).
24Minimum monthly wage as a proportion of average monthly earnings in industry and
services (source: Eurostat). For France, the gure has been calculated by the author
dividing the hourly gross wage by the average gross hourly wage for a full-time employee
in industry, trade and services (data source: INSEE.)
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Figure 5: Kaitz index and minimum wage spike
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minimum wage level and the estimated size of the informal economy (see
gure 4). As mentioned in the introduction, other mechanisms have been
proposed to explain the existence of a spike at the minimum wage level and
one natural "culprit" for a high spike would be a minimum wage "biting"
deeply into the wage distribution. However, no clear relationship appears
between a measure of this "bite", the Kaitz index, and the size of the spike
(see gure 5).
Regression analysis (see table 2) conrms that the positive relationship
between the spike and the informal economy is not driven by a high mini-
mum wage resulting in both a high spike and a sizeable informal economy.
Regressing the size of the spike on the size of the informal economy and the
Kaitz index, the former is signicant, while the latter is not. The model
suggests that the positive correlation between the size of the spike and the
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size of the informal economy is instead driven by the common dependence
on enforcement parameters. The regression implies that a 1% increase in the
size of the informal economy is associated with a 0.28% increase in the share
of employees earning the minimum wage.
Table 2: Determinants of minimum wage spike
Informal Economy as % of O¢ cial GDP (2002)
0:279
(0:113)
Minimum Wage / Average Wage (2002)
0:179
(0:179)
Constant
 8:337
(8:381)
R2 0:30
Observations 17
a. Dependent variable is spike at minimum wage level in 2002.
b. OLS estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis.
c. *** [**] (*) denote signicance at 1, [5], and (10) percent level.
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